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Abstract. We introduce the concept of a V-formation game between
a controller and an attacker, where controller’s goal is to maneuver the
plant (a simple model of flocking dynamics) into a V-formation, and the
goal of the attacker is to prevent the controller from doing so. Controllers
in V-formation games utilize a new formulation of model-predictive con-
trol we call Adaptive-Horizon MPC (AMPC), giving them extraordi-
nary power: we prove that under certain controllability assumptions, an
AMPC controller is able to attain V-formation with probability 1.
We define several classes of attackers, including those that in one move
can removeR birds from the flock, or introduce random displacement into
flock dynamics. We consider both naive attackers, whose strategies are
purely probabilistic, and AMPC-enabled attackers, putting them on par
strategically with the controllers. While an AMPC-enabled controller is
expected to win every game with probability 1, in practice, it is resource-
constrained : its maximum prediction horizon and the maximum number
of game execution steps are fixed. Under these conditions, an attacker
has a much better chance of winning a V-formation game.
Our extensive performance evaluation of V-formation games uses statisti-
cal model checking to estimate the probability an attacker can thwart the
controller. Our results show that for the bird-removal game with R= 1,
the controller almost always wins (restores the flock to a V-formation).
For R= 2, the game outcome critically depends on which two birds are
removed. For the displacement game, our results again demonstrate that
an intelligent attacker, i.e. one that uses AMPC in this case, significantly
outperforms its naive counterpart that randomly executes its attack.
1 Introduction
Many Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are highly distributed in nature, com-
prising a multitude of computing agents that can collectively exhibit emergent
behavior. A compelling example of such a distributed CPS is the drone swarm,
which are beginning to see increasing application in battlefield surveillance and
reconnaisance [3]. The emergent behavior they exhibit is that of flight formation.
A particularly interesting form of flight formation is V-formation, especially
for long-range missions where energy conservation is key. V-formation is em-
blematic of migratory birds such as Canada geese, where a bird flying in the
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upwash region of the bird in front of it can enjoy significant energy savings.
The V-formation also offers a clear view benefit, as no bird’s field of vision is
obstructed by another bird in the formation. Because of the V-formation’s in-
trinsic appeal, it is important to quantify the resiliency of the control algorithms
underlying this class of multi-agent CPSs to various kinds of cyber-attacks. This
question provides the motivation for the investigation put forth in this paper.
Problem Statement and Summary of Results. We introduce the concept of V-
formation games, where the goal of the controller is to maneuver the plant (a
simple model of flocking dynamics) into a V-formation, and the goal of the
attacker is to prevent the controller from doing so. Controllers in V-formation
games utilize a new formulation of model-predictive control we call Adaptive
Receding-Horizon MPC (AMPC), giving them extraordinary power: we prove
that under certain controllability conditions, an AMPC controller can attain
V-formation with probability 1.
We define several classes of attackers, including those that in one move can re-
move a small numberR of birds from the flock, or introduce random displacement
(perturbation) into the flock dynamics, again by selecting a small number of vic-
tim agents. We consider both naive attackers, whose strategies are purely prob-
abilistic, and AMPC-enabled attackers, putting them on par strategically with
the controllers. The architecture of a V-formation game with an AMPC-enabled
attacker is shown in Figure 1. While an AMPC-enabled controller is expected
to win every game with probability 1, in practice, it is resource-constrained :
its maximum prediction horizon and the maximum number of game execution
steps are fixed in advance. Under these conditions, an attacker has a much better
chance of winning a V-formation game.
AMPC is a key contribution of the work presented in this paper. Traditional
MPC uses a fixed finite prediction horizon to determine the optimal control
action. Hence, it may get stuck in local minima. The AMPC procedure chooses
it dynamically. Thus, AMPC can adapt to the severity of the action played by
its adversary by choosing its own horizon accordingly. The AMPC procedure is
inspired by an adaptive optimization procedure recently presented in [9].
Our extensive performance evaluation of V-formation games uses statistical
model checking to estimate the probability that an attacker can thwart the con-
troller. Our results show that for the bird-removal game withR= 1, the controller
almost always wins (restores the flock to a V-formation). For R= 2, the game
outcome critically depends on which two birds are removed. For the displace-
ment game, our results again demonstrate that an intelligent attacker, i.e. one
that uses AMPC in this case, significantly outperforms its naive counterpart
that randomly executes its attack.
Traditional feedback control is, by design, resilient to noise, and also certain
kinds of attacks; as our results show, however, it may not be resilient against
smart attacks. Adaptive-horizon control helps to guard against a larger class of
attacks, but it can still falter due to limited resources. Our results also demon-
strate that statistical model checking represents a promising approach toward
the evaluation CPS resilience against a wide range of attacks.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our dynamic
model of V-formation in a flock of autonomous agents, and Section 3 defines our
controller-attacker stochastic games. Section 4 presents AMPC, and Section 5
shows how AMPC is used in the V-formation games we consider. Section 6 gives
a critical analysis of our results, and Section 7 discusses related work. Section 8
offers our concluding remarks and directions for future work.
2 V-Formation
We consider the problem of bringing a flock of B birds from a random initial
configuration to an organized V-formation. Recently, Lukina et al. [9] have mod-
eled this problem as a deterministic Markov Decision Process (MDP)M, where
the goal was to generate actions that caused M to reach a desired state.
In our case, M is an MDP. The state of each bird in the flock is modeled
using 4 variables: a 2-dimensional vector x denoting the position of the bird
in a 2D space, and a 2-dimensional vector v denoting the velocity of the bird.
Thus, the state space of M is R4B representing a flock of B birds. The control
actions of each bird are 2-dimensional accelerations a and 2-dimensional position
displacements d (see discussion of a and d below). Both are random variables.
Let xi(t),vi(t),ai(t), and di(t) denote the position, velocity, acceleration,
and displacement of the i-th bird at time t, respectively. Then, the transition
relation of the MDP M is given as follows:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + vi(t+ 1) + di(t) ∀ i∈{1, . . . , B},
vi(t+ 1) = vi(t) + ai(t). (1)
Once the current acceleration and displacement are sampled, the next state is
uniquely determined by (1) from the current state in M [9].
The problem of whether we can go from a random flock to a V-formation
is a reachability question. The reachability goal is the set of states representing
a V-formation. A key assumption in [9] was that the reachability goal can be
specified using a fitness function J , which assigns a non-negative real (fitness)
value to each state in M.
The fitness of a state was determined by the following three terms:
– Clear View (CV ). A bird’s visual field is a cone with angle θ that can be
blocked by the wings of other birds. The clear-view metric is defined by
accumulating the percentage of a bird’s visual field that is blocked by other
birds. The CV for the flock is the sum of the clear-view metric of all birds.
The minimum value of CV is CV ∗= 0, and this value is attained in a perfect
V-formation where all birds have clear view.
– Velocity Matching (VM ). VM is defined as the difference between the ve-
locity of a given bird and all other birds, summed up over all birds in the
flock. The minimum value for VM is VM ∗= 0, and this value is attained in
a perfect V-formation where all birds have the same velocity.
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– Upwash Benefit (UB). The trailing upwash is generated near the wingtips
of a bird, while downwash is generated near the center of a bird. An upwash
measure um is defined on the 2D space using a Gaussian-like model that
peaks at the appropriate upwash and downwash regions. For bird i with
upwash umi, the upwash-benefit metric UB i is defined as 1−umi, and UB
for the flock is the sum of all UB i ∀ i∈{1, . . . , B}. The upwash benefit UB
of a flock in V-formation is UB∗= 1, as all birds, except for the leader, have
minimum upwash-benefit metric (UB i = 0, umi = 1), while the leader has
upwash-benefit metric of 1 (UB i = 1, umi = 0).
Let s = {xi,vi}Bi=1 be a state of a flock with B birds. Given the above metrics,
the overall fitness (cost) metric J is of a sum-of-squares combination of VM ,
CV , and UB defined as follows:
J(s) = (CV (s)− CV ∗)2 + (VM (s)−VM ∗)2 + (UB(s)−UB∗)2. (2)
A state s∗ is considered to be a V-formation whenever J(s∗)<ϕ, for a certain
small threshold ϕ.
Given the above flocking model, the goal is to bring the flock from any
configuration to a V-formation. Recall that we had two sets of control variables:
accelerations a and displacements d for each bird of the flock. We consider
the scenario where the accelerations are under the control of one agent (the
controller), and the displacements (position perturbations) are under the control
of a second malicious agent (the attacker). This partition of the actions of the
MDP into disjoint sets gives rise to a stochastic game on an MDP, which is
described next.
3 Controller-Attacker Games: Problem Definition
We are interested in games between a controller and an attacker, where the goal
of the controller is to take the system to a desired set of states, and the goal
of the attacker is to keep the system outside these states. We formulate our
problem by using a Markov Decision Processes (MDP) such that the controller
and the attacker jointly determine the transition probabilities.
Definition 1. A Markov Decision Process (MDP)M is a tuple (S,A, T, J)
consisting of: (1) a set S of states, (2) a set A of actions, (3) a function
T : S×A×S 7→ [0, 1], where T (s, a, s′) is the probability of transitioning from
state s to state s′ under action a, and (4) a function J : S 7→R, where J(s) is
the reward (fitness) associated to state s.
In a stochastic game [15], the transition probability from state s to state s′
is controlled jointly by two players, a controller and an attacker in our case. To
view an MDP as a stochastic game, we assume that the set of actions A is given
as a product C ×D, where the controller chooses the C-component of an action
a and the attacker chooses the D-component of a. We assume that the game
is played in parallel by the controller and the attacker; i.e., they both take the
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Controller
a(t) = AMPC (f,x(t),v(t), J)
Advanced Attacker
d(t) = AMPC (g,x(t),v(t),−J)
Flock
v(t + 1) = v(t) + a(t)
x(t + 1) = x(t) + v(t + 1) + d(t)
a(t)
d(t)
x(t+ 1),v(t+ 1)
Fig. 1. Controller-Attacker Game Architecture
state s(t) ∈ S of the system at time t, compute their respective actions c(t) ∈ C
and d(t) ∈ D, and then use the composed action (c(t), d(t)) to determine the
next state s(t+ 1) ∈ S of the system (based on the transition function T ).
We consider randomized strategies for both the controller and the attacker.
A randomized strategy is a mapping taking every state s to a probability distri-
bution P (a | s) over the (available) actions. Once we fix a randomized strategy
for the controller, and a randomized strategy for the attacker, the MDP reduces
to a Markov chain on the state space S. Thus, the controller and attacker jointly
fix the probability of transitioning from a state s to a state s′.
In this paper, we consider reachability games only. In other words, we are
given a set G of “good” states and the goal of the controller is to reach a state
in G. Let s0→ s1→ s2→ · · · be a sequence of states (a run of the system). The
controller wins on this run if ∃i : si ∈ G, and the attacker wins otherwise.
We are interested in discrete-time continuous-space dynamical systems. For-
mally, the state space S is Rn and the action space A is in Rm. In the bird
flocking example, n=m= 4 ·B, where B is the number of birds. We have four
state variables and four action variables, respectively for each bird. They rep-
resent the x- and the y-components of the position xi, velocity vi, acceleration
ai, and displacement di of each bird i, respectively.
A classical problem in the study of games pertains to determining the ex-
istence of an optimal winning strategy (e.g. a Nash equilibrium) for a player.
We are not concerned with such problems in this paper. Due to the uncount-
ably many states in the state- and action-space, solving such problems for our
games of interest is extremely challenging. Instead, we focus on the problem of
determining the likely winner of a game where the strategy of the two players
is fixed. Since we consider randomized strategies, determining the likely winner
is a statistical model checking problem. In other words, we want to evaluate the
resilience of certain controllers under certain attack models.
We are now ready to formally define the problem we would like to solve.
Definition 2 (Stochastic-game verification problem). LetM= (S,A, T, J)
be an MDP, where A=C ×D, and randomized strategies σC : S 7→PD(C) and
σD : S 7→PD(D) mapping states S to probability distributions over C and D.
The stochastic-game verification problem is to determine the probability of reach-
ing a state in G⊂S in m steps, for a given m, starting from an initial state
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(taken from a given probability distribution) in the underlying Markov chain in-
duced by strategies σC , σD on the MDP M.
Let us specify the randomized strategies. For a strategy σ, we assume that
we are given a randomized algorithm that takes a state s and returns an action
consistent with the probability distribution σ(s).
Our main interest here is in evaluating the resilience of a specific controller al-
gorithm σC . The key assumption that the controller and the attacker algorithms
make is the existence of a fitness function J : S 7→R+ such that
G := {s | J(s) < ϕ for some very small ϕ > 0} .
Given such a fitness metric J , the controller works by minimizing the fitness
of states reachable, in one or more steps, as it is done in model-predictive con-
trol (MPC). Since the fitness function is highly nonlinear, the controller uses
an optimization procedure based on randomization to search for a minimum.
Hence, our controller is a randomized procedure. One possible attack strategy
we consider (for an advanced attacker) is based on the fitness function as well:
the attacker tries to maximize the fitness of reachable states.
A key contribution of our work is an adaptive MPC procedure called AMPC.
Recall that traditional MPC uses a fixed finite horizon to determine the best
control action. The AMPC procedure chooses it dynamically. Thus, AMPC can
adapt to the severity of the action played by its adversary by choosing its own
horizon accordingly. The AMPC procedure is inspired by an adaptive optimiza-
tion procedure recently presented in [9], which dynamically changes the amount
of the effort it uses to search for a better solution in each step. The motivation
for adaptation in [9] however was different, namely to take the optimizer out of
a local minimum, and thus, ensure convergence to a global optimum.
4 The Adaptive-Horizon MPC Algorithm
We now present our new adaptive-horizon model-predictive-control algorithm, we
call AMPC. We will use this algorithm as the controller strategy in the stochastic
game on MDPs. We will also consider attack strategies that use AMPC. Since
AMPC is an adaptive MPC procedure based on particle-swarm optimization
(PSO), we first briefly present background material on MPC and PSO.
4.1 Background on Model-Predictive Control
Model-predictive control (MPC) determines the control action at current time
t by looking h steps into the future and finding the best h-length sequence of
control actions that can take the system from its current state s(t) to a new
state that has the lowest fitness. (Since we assume existence of a fitness metric
J that we are trying to minimize, we specialize the description of MPC to this
case.) If sah(t+ h) denotes the state reached from state s(t) in time h following
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the actions ah of length h, then in the MPC approach, at each time step t, the
following minimization is performed to find the optimal set of actions
opt-ah(t) = arg min
ah(t)
J(sah(t+ h)). (3)
Since the model is an approximation of the system, only the first action a(t) =
opt-a1(t) is applied as the action at time t, and the remaining future h−1 actions
found by the optimizer are ignored. After the control action a(t) is applied, the
system is left to evolve, and the process is repeated at t+ 1, t+ 2, and so on.
The MPC approach can be used for achieving a V-formation, as was out-
lined in [16,17]. These earlier works, however, did not use an adaptive dynamic
window, and did not consider the adversarial control problem.
In MPC, optimization problem (3) is additionally subject to constraints that
bound the set of possible actions and states. For example, in our flocking model,
the magnitude of velocity and acceleration for each of the B birds is bounded:
||vi(t)||6vmax, ||ahi (t)||6 ρ||vi(t)|| ∀ i∈{1, . . . , B}, where vmax is a predefined
constant and ρ∈ (0, 1).
We use a particle-swarm-optimization algorithm to solve the optimization
problems generated by the MPC procedure.
4.2 Background on Particle Swarm Optimization
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) is a randomized approximation algorithm
for determining the parameters that minimize a possibly nonlinear and possibly
discontinuous cost (or fitness) function. PSO was first introduced by [8]. In an
interesting twist of events, PSO took its original inspiration from bird flocking.
The PSO procedure is best described using the metaphor of a swarm of
insects collaboratively trying to find the location of food. The insects, also called
particles, live in the space defined by all possible valuations of the unknown
parameters (of the optimization problem). The food is located at the position
where the objective function is minimized. PSO works by having a swarm of
particles, which have the same goal of finding food (the reward) without knowing
its location. Each particle is informed about its distance to the food (value of the
objective function). The PSO algorithm repeatedly redistributes each particle
towards the one closest to the food, with a speed proportional to the distance
separating them, until all particles converge to the same position.
AMPC employs Matlab’s toolbox particleswarm, which performs the clas-
sical version of PSO. A swarm of p particles is sampled uniformly at random
within a given bound on their positions and velocities. In the bird flocking ex-
ample, if we try to find acceleration vectors by optimization over horizon h, then
one “particle” represents h 2-dimensional vectors for each of the B birds, along
with a vector of values that determine how these h ·B acceleration vectors will
be updated. After choosing a neighborhood of random size for each particle j,
j ∈{1, . . . , p}, PSO computes the value of the given fitness function for each par-
ticle, and stores two vectors for each particle j: its so-far personal-best position
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xjP (t), and the position of its fittest neighbor x
j
G(t). The positions and velocities
of the particle swarm j ∈{1, . . . , p} are updated the following way:
vj(t+ 1) = ω · vj(t) + y1 · u1(t+ 1)⊗ (xjP (t)− xj(t))
+ y2 · u2(t+ 1)⊗ (xjG(t)− xj(t)), (4)
where ω is an inertia weight, which quantifies the trade-off between global and
local exploration of the swarm (the value of ω is proportional to the exploration
range); y1 and y2 are the self adjustment and the social adjustment, respectively;
u1,u2 ∈Uniform(0, 1) are random variables; and ⊗ is the vector dot product,
that is, ∀ random vector z: (z1, . . . , zb)⊗ (xj1, . . . ,xjb) = (z1xj1, . . . , zbxjb).
If the value of the fitness computed at each step of the PSO for xj(t +
1) = xj(t) + vj(t + 1) falls below the one for xjP (t), then x
j(t + 1) is reassigned
to xjP (t + 1). A global best for the next iteration is determined as the particle
with the best fitness among j ∈{1, . . . , p}. The stopping criterion of the PSO
algorithm is either reaching the maximum number of iterations set in advance,
or reaching the set time bound, or satisfying the minimum criterion.
PSO can be used to solve any optimization problem. We use it to solve
the optimization problem generated in the MPC approach. In a V-formation
game, it can be used to obtain the birds’ best accelerations, or even the best
displacements, at each time step – depending on whether MPC/PSO is being
used by the controller or the attacker.
Remark. We assume that PSO is fair, in the sense that it has a chance to
sample all the points in the parameter space, and therefore it has the chance to
find the optimal solution with probability one, given enough time.
4.3 The Main Algorithm of AMPC
We propose the main algorithm of AMPC. This algorithm performs step-by-step
control of a given MDP M by looking h steps ahead and predicting the next
best state to move to. We use PSO to identify the potentially best actions ah in
the current state achieving the optimal value of the fitness function in the next
state. For bird flocking, the fitness function, Fitness(M,ah, h) of ah is defined
as the minimum fitness metric J obtained within h steps by applying ah onM.
Formally, we have
Fitness(M,ah, h) = min
16τ6h
J(sτah) (5)
where sτah is the state after apply the τth action of a
h onM. For horizon h, PSO
searches for the best sequence of 2-dimensional acceleration vector of length h,
thus having 2Bh parameters to be optimized. The number of particles used in
PSO is proportional to the number of parameters, i.e., p = 2βBh.
The pseudocode for the AMPC algorithm is given in Algorithm 1. A novel
feature of AMPC is that, unlike classical MPC that uses a fixed horizon h, AMPC
adaptively chooses an h depending on whether it is able to reach a fitness value
that is lower than the current fitness by our chosen quanta ∆i, ∀ i∈{0, . . . ,m}.
8
AMPC is hence an adaptive MPC procedure that uses level-based horizons.
It employs PSO to identify the potentially best next actions. If the chosen actions
improve (decrease) the fitness of the next state J(sk+h), ∀ k∈{0, . . . ,m ·hmax},
in comparison to the fitness of the previous state J(sk) by the predefined ∆i,
the controller considers these actions to be worthy of leading the flock towards
or keeping it in the V-formation.4
In this case, the controller applies the actions to each bird and transitions
to the next state of the MDP. The threshold ∆i determines the next level
`i = J(sk+ĥ) of the algorithm, where ĥ 6 h is the horizon with the best fit-
ness. The prediction horizon h is increased iteratively if the fitness has not been
decreased enough. Upon reaching a new level, the horizon is reset to one (see
Algorithm 1). Having a horizon ĥ > 1 means it will take multiple transitions in
the MDP in order to reach a solution with improved fitness. However, when find-
ing such a solution with ĥ > 1, we only apply the first action to transition the
MDP to the next state. This is explained by the need to allow the other player
(environment or an adversary) to apply their action before we obtain the actual
next state. If no new level is reached within hmax horizons, the first action of
the best ah using horizon hmax is applied.
The dynamic threshold ∆i is defined as in [9]. Its initial value ∆0 is ob-
tained by dividing the fitness range to be covered into m equal parts, that is,
∆0 = (`0− `m) /m, where `0 = J(s0) and `m =ϕ. Subsequently, ∆i is determined
by the previously reached level `i−1, as ∆i = `i−1/(m− i+ 1). This way AMPC
advances only if `i = J(sk+ĥ) is at least ∆i apart from `i−1 = J(sk).
This approach allows us to force PSO to escape from a local minimum, even if
this implies passing over a bump, by gradually increasing the exploration horizon
h. We assume that the MDP is controllable and that the set G of good states
is not empty, which means, that from any state, it is possible to reach a state
whose fitness decreased by at least ∆i. Algorithm 1 illustrates our approach.
Theorem 1 (AMPC Convergence). Given an MDP M= (S,A, T, J) with
positive and continuous fitness function J , and a nonempty set of target states
G⊂S with G= {s | J(s)<ϕ}. If the transition relation T is controllable with
actions in A, then there is a finite maximum horizon hmax and a finite number
of execution steps m, such that AMPC is able to find a sequence of actions
a1, . . . , am that brings a state in S to a state in G with probability one.
Proof. In each (macro) step of horizon length h, from level `i−1 = J(sk) to level
`i = J(sk+ĥ), AMPC decreases the distance to ϕ by ∆i>∆, where ∆> 0 is fixed
by the number of steps m chosen in advance. Hence, AMPC converges to a state
in G in a finite number of steps, for a properly chosen m. AMPC is able to
decrease the fitness in a macro step by ∆i by the controllability assumption and
the fairness assumption about the PSO algorithm. Since AMPC is a randomized
algorithm, the result is probabilistic.
4 We focus our attention on bird flocking, since the details generalize naturally to
other MDPs that come with a fitness metric.
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Algorithm 1: AMPC: Adaptive Model-Predictive Control
Input : M, ϕ, hmax ,m,B, Fitness
Output: {ai}16i6m // optimal control sequence
1 Initialize `0 ← J(s0); Ĵ ← inf; p← 2βBh; i← 1; h← 1; ∆0 ← (`0 − ϕ)/m;
2 while (`i−1 > ϕ) ∧ (i < m) do
3 // find and apply first best action out of the horizon sequence of length h
4 [ah, Ĵ ]←particleswarm(Fitness,M, p, h);
5 if `i−1 − Ĵ > ∆i ∨ h = hmax then
6 // if a new level or the maximum horizon is reached
7 ai ← ah1 ; M←Ma
i
; // apply the action and move to the next state
8 `i ← J(s(M)); // update `i with the fitness of the current state
9 ∆i ← `i/(m− i); // update the threshold on reaching the next level
10 i← i+ 1; h← 1; p← 2βBh; // update parameters
11 else
12 h← h+ 1; p← 2βBh; // increase the horizon
13 end
14 end
Note that AMPC is a general procedure that performs adaptive MPC using
PSO for dynamical systems that are controllable, come with a fitness metric,
and have at least one optimal solution. In an adversarial situation two players
have opposing objectives. The question arises what one player assumes about
the other when computing its own action, which we discuss next.
5 Stochastic Games for V-Formation
We describe the specialization of the stochastic-game verification problem to
V-formation. In particular, we present the AMPC-based control strategy for
reaching a V-formation, and the various attacker strategies against which we
evaluate the resilience of our controller.
The MDPM for V-formation was presented in Section 2. The state variables
of the MDP are the positions and velocities of the birds, and the control variables
(defining the actions) are the accelerations and displacements. In the transition
relation given in equation (1), the attacker chooses the displacement d(t) it
needs to manipulate the position of the birds, whereas the controller chooses
the acceleration a(t) to apply. Together, the pair (a(t),d(t)) defines the action
that transforms one MDP state to another. We now define the controller’s and
attacker’s strategies.
5.1 Controller’s Adaptive Strategies
Given current state (x(t),v(t)), the controller’s strategy σC returns a proba-
bility distribution on the space of all possible accelerations (for all birds). As
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mentioned above, this probability distribution is specified implicitly via a ran-
domized algorithm that returns an actual acceleration (again for all birds). This
randomized algorithm is the AMPC algorithm, which inherits its randomization
from the randomized PSO procedure it deploys.
When the controller computes an acceleration, it assumes that the attacker
does not introduce any disturbances; i.e., the controller uses the following model:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + vi(t+ 1) ∀ i∈{1, . . . , B},
vi(t+ 1) = vi(t) + ai(t), (6)
where a(t) is the only control variable. Note that the controller chooses its next
action a(t) based on the current configuration (x(t),v(t)) of the flock using
MPC. The current configuration may have been influenced by the disturbance
d(t−1) introduced by the attacker in the previous time step. Hence, the current
state need not be the state predicted by the controller when performing MPC in
step t−1. Moreover, depending on the severity of the attacker action d(t−1), the
AMPC procedure dynamically adapts its behavior, i.e. the choice of horizon h,
in order to enable the controller to pick the best control action a(t) in response.
5.2 Attacker’s Strategies
We are interested in evaluating the resilience of our V-formation controller when
it is threatened by an attacker that can remove a certain number of birds from
the flock, or manipulate a certain number of birds by taking control of their
actuators (modeled by the displacement term in equation (1)). We assume that
the attack lasts for a limited amount of time, after which the controller attempts
to bring the system back into the good set of states. When there is no attack,
the system behavior is the one given by equation (6).
Note that there can be many different criteria for evaluating the success of
an attack, but in our experiments, the controller is declared the winner if it can
bring the flock to V-formation. We consider three attack strategies (but see the
future work discussion in Section 8), each of which defines a V-formation game.
Remove Birds Game. In an RBG, the attacker selects a subset of R birds,
where RB, and removes them from the flock. The removal of bird i from the
flock at time t= 0 can be simulated in our framework by allowing the attacker
to set the displacement di(0) for bird i to ∞. We assume that the flock is in a
V-formation at time t= 0. Thus, the goal of the controller is to bring the flock
back into a V-formation consisting of B−R birds. In an RBG, the attacker
plays only one move. When picking birds, the attacker is able to decide which
birds will have the greatest negative impact on the flock’s fitness when removed
from the flock. Apart from seeing if the controller can bring the flock back to a
V-formation, we also analyze the time it takes the controller to do so.
Random Displacement Game. In an RDG, the attacker chooses the displace-
ment vector for a fixed number R of birds uniformly from the space [0,M ] ×
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[0, 2pi]. This means that the magnitude of the displacement vector is picked from
the interval [0,M ], and the direction of the displacement vector is picked from
the interval [0, 2pi]. We vary M in our experiments. The R birds that are picked
in different steps are not necessarily the same, as the attacker makes this choice
uniformly at random at runtime as well. The game starts from an initial V-
formation. The attacker is allowed a fixed number of moves, say 20, after which
the displacement vector is identically 0 for all birds. The controller, which has
been running in parallel with the attacker, is then tasked with moving the flock
back to a V-formation, if necessary.
AMPC Game. An AMPC game is similar to an RDG except that the attacker
does not use a uniform distribution to determine the displacement vector. The
attacker is advanced and calculates the displacement (that will be the worst for
the controller) using the AMPC procedure. See Figure 1. In detail, the attacker
applies AMPC, but assumes the controller applies zero acceleration. Thus, the
attacker uses the following model of the flock dynamics:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + vi(t+ 1) + di(t) ∀ i∈{1, . . . , B},
vi(t+ 1) = vi(t). (7)
Note that the attacker is still allowed to have di(t) be nonzero for a small number
R of birds. However, it can choose which R birds it picks in each step. It uses the
AMPC procedure to simultaneously pick the R birds and their displacements.
Theorem 2 (AMPC resilience in a C-A game). Given a controller-attacker
game, there is a finite maximum horizon hmax and a finite maximum number
of game-execution steps m such that AMPC controller will win the controller-
attacker game in m steps with probability one.
Proof. Since the flock MDP (defined by Equation 6) is controllable, the PSO
algorithm we use is fair, and the attack has a bounded duration, the proof of
the theorem follows from Theorem 1.
Remark 1. While Theorem 2 states that the controller is expected to win with
probability one, we expect winning probability to be possibly lower than one in
many cases because: (1) the maximum horizon hmax is fixed in advance, and
so is (2) the maximum number of execution steps m; (3) the underlying PSO
algorithm is also run with bounded number of particles and time.
6 Statistical MC Evaluation of V-Formation Games
As discussed in Section 3, the stochastic-game verification problem we address in
the context of the V-formation-AMPC algorithm is formulated as follows. Given
a flock MDP M (we consider the case of B= 7 birds), acceleration actions a of
the controller, displacement actions d of the attacker, the randomized strategy
σC : S 7→PD(C) of the controller (the AMPC algorithm), and a randomized
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strategy σD : S 7→PD(D) for the attacker, determine the probability of reaching
a state s where the fitness function J(s)<ϕ (V-formation in a 7-bird flock),
starting from an initial state (in this case this is a V-formation), in the underlying
Markov chain induced by strategies σC , σD on M.
Since the exact solution to this reachability is intractable due to the infi-
nite/continuous space of states and actions, we solve it approximately with clas-
sical statistical model-checking (SMC). The particular SMC procedure we use is
described in [6] and based on an additive or absolute-error (ε, δ)-Monte-Carlo-
approximation scheme. This technique requires running N i.i.d. game executions,
each for a given maximum time horizon, computing if these executions reach a
V-formation, and returning the average number of times this occurs.
The N i.i.d. experiments determine the random variables Z1, ..., ZN , where
the sample mean µZ = (Z1 + . . .+ZN )/N is assumed to be sufficiently greater
than 0. In this case, one can exploit the Bernstein’s inequality and fix N to
Υ ∝ ln(1/δ)/ε2. This results in an additive-error (ε, δ)-approximation scheme:
Pr [µZ − ε 6 µ˜Z 6 µZ + ε)] > 1− δ,
where µ˜Z approximates µZ with absolute error ε and probability 1 − δ. In our
case, each Zi is a Bernoulli random variable, where 1 means that the execution
ends in a V-formation, and 0 means the opposite:
Z =
{
1, if ∃t ∈ [0,m], J(s(t)) < ϕ,
0, otherwise.
This allows us to use the Chernoff-Hoeffding instantiation of the Bernstein’s
inequality, and fix the proportionality constant to Υ = 4 ln(2/δ)/ε2, as in [7].
Each of the games described in Section 5 is executed 2,000 times. For a
confidence ratio δ= 0.01, we thus obtain an additive error of ε= 0.1.
We use the following parameters in the game executions: number of birds
B= 7, threshold on the fitness ϕ= 10−3, maximum horizon hmax = 5, number
of particles in PSO p= 20B h. In RBG, the controller is allowed to run for a
maximum of 30 steps. In RDG and AMPC game, the attacker and the controller
run in parallel for 20 steps, after which the displacement becomes 0, and the
controller has a maximum of 20 more steps to restore the flock to a V-formation.
To perform SMC evaluation of our AMPC approach we designed the above
experiments in C and ran them on the Intel Core i7-5820K CPU with 3.30 GHz
and with 32GB RAM available.
Table 1. Results of 2,000 game executions for removing 1 bird with hmax = 5, m= 40
Ctrl. success rate, % Avg. convergence duration Avg. horizon
Bird 4 99.9 12.75 3.64
Bird 3 99.8 18.98 4.25
Bird 2 100 10.82 3.45
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Fig. 2. Left: numbering of the birds. Right: configuration after removing Bird 2 and 5.
The red-filled circle and two protruding line segments represent a bird’s body and
wings. Arrows represent bird velocities. Dotted lines illustrate clear-view cones. A
brighter/darker background color indicates a higher upwash/downwash.
Table 2. Results of 2,000 game executions for removing 2 birds with hmax = 5, m= 30
Ctrl. success rate, % Avg. convergence duration Avg. horizon
Birds 2 and 3 0.8 25.18 4.30
Birds 2 and 4 83.1 11.11 2.94
Birds 2 and 5 80.3 9.59 2.83
Birds 2 and 6 98.6 7.02 2.27
Birds 3 and 4 2.0 22.86 4.30
Birds 3 and 5 92.8 11.8 3.43
6.1 Discussion of the Results
To demonstrate the resilience of our adaptive controller, for each game intro-
duced in Section 5, we performed a number of experiments to estimate the prob-
ability of the controller winning. Moreover, for the runs where the controller
wins, the average number of steps required by the controller to bring the flock
to a V-formation is reported as average convergence duration, and the average
length of the horizon used by AMPC is reported as average horizon.
The numbering of the birds in Tables 1 and 2 is given in Figure 2. Bird-
removal scenarios that are symmetric with the ones in the tables are omitted.
The results presented in Table 1 are for the RBG game with R= 1. In this case,
the controller is almost always able to bring the flock back to a V-formation, as
is evident from Table 1. Note that removing Bird 1 (or 7) is a trivial case that
results in a V-formation.
In the case when R= 2, shown in Table 2, the success rate of the controller de-
pends on which two birds are removed. Naturally, there are cases where dropping
two birds does not break the V-formation; for example, after dropping Birds 1
and 2, the remaining birds continue to be in a V-formation. Such trivial cases
are not shown in Table 2. Note that the scenario of removing Bird 1 (or 7) and
one other bird can be viewed as removing one bird in flock of 6 birds, thus not
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Table 3. Results of 2,000 game executions for random displacement and AMPC attacks
with hmax = 5 and m= 40 (attacker runs for 20 steps)
Range of noise Ctrl. success rate, % Avg. convergence duration Avg. horizon
Random displacement game
[0, 0.50]× [0, 2pi] 99.9 3.33 1.07
[0, 0.75]× [0, 2pi] 97.9 3.61 1.11
[0, 1.00]× [0, 2pi] 92.3 4.14 1.18
AMPC game
[0, 0.50]× [0, 2pi] 97.5 4.29 1.09
[0, 0.75]× [0, 2pi] 63.4 5.17 1.23
[0, 1.00]× [0, 2pi] 20.0 7.30 1.47
considered in this table. Among the other nontrivial cases, the success rate of
controller drops slightly in four cases, and drops drastically in remaining two
cases. This suggests that attacker of a CPS system can incur more damage by
being prudent in the choice of the attack.
Impressively, whenever the controller wins, the controller needs about the
same number of steps to get back to V-formation (as in the one-bird removal
case). On average, removal of two birds results in a configuration that has worse
fitness compared to an RBG with R= 1. Hence, the adaptive controller is able
to make bigger improvements (in each step) when challenged by worse configu-
rations. Furthermore, among the four cases where the controller win rate is high,
experimental results demonstrate that removing two birds positioned asymmet-
rically with respect to the leader poses a stronger, however, still manageable
threat to the formation. For instance, the scenarios of removing birds 2 and 6
or 3 and 5 give the controller a significantly higher chance to recover from the
attack, 98.6% and 92.8%, respectively.
Table 3 explores the effect of making the attacker smarter. Compared to
an attacker that makes random changes in displacement, an attacker that uses
AMPC to pick its action is able to win more often. This again shows that an
attacker of a CPS system can improve its chances by cleverly choosing the at-
tack. For example, the probability of success for the controller to recover drops
from 92.3% to 20.0% when the attacker uses AMPC to pick displacements with
magnitude in [0, 1] and direction in [0, 2pi]. The entries in the other two columns
in Table 3 reveal two even more interesting facts.
First, in the cases when the controller wins, we clearly see that the controller
uses a longer look-ahead when facing a more challenging attack. This follows
from the observation that the average horizon value increases with the strength
of attack. This gives evidence for the fact that the adaptive component of our
AMPC plays a pivotal role in providing resilience against sophisticated attacks.
Second, the average horizon still being in the range 1-1.5, means that the adap-
tation in our AMPC procedure also helps it perform better than a fixed-horizon
MPC procedure, where usually the horizon is fixed to h> 2. When a low value
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of h (say h= 1) suffices, the AMPC procedure avoids unnecessary calculation
that using a fixed h might incur.
In the cases where success rate was low (Row 5 in Table 2 and Row 6 in
Table 3), we observed improved success rate (9% and 30.8% respectively across
500 runs) when we increased hmax to 10 and m to 40. This shows that success
rate of AMPC improves as it is given more resources, as predicted by Theorem 1.
7 Related Work
In the field of CPS security, one of the most widely studied attacks is sen-
sor spoofing. When sensors measurements are compromised, state estimation
becomes challenging, which inspired a considerable amount of work on attack-
resilient state estimation [4, 5, 12–14]. In these approaches, resilience to attacks
is typically achieved by assuming the presence of redundant sensors, or coding
sensor outputs. In our work, we do not consider sensor spoofing attacks, but
assume the attacker gets control of the displacement vectors (for some of the
birds/drones). We have not explicitly stated the mechanism by which an at-
tacker obtains this capability, but it is easy to envision ways (radio controller,
attack via physical medium, or other channels [2]) for doing so.
Adaptive control, and its special case of adaptive model predictive control,
typically refers to the aspect of the controller updating its process model that
it uses to compute the control action. The field of adaptive control is concerned
with the discrepancy between the actual process and its model used by the con-
troller. In our adaptive-horizon MPC, we adapt the lookahead horizon employed
by the MPC, and not the model itself. Hence, the work in this paper is orthogonal
to what is done in adaptive control [1, 10].
A key focus in CPS security has also been detection of attacks. For example,
recent work considers displacement-based attacks on formation flight [11], but it
primarily concerned with detecting which UAV was attacked using an unknown-
input-observer based approach. We are not concerned with detecting attacks, but
establishing that the adaptive nature of our controller provides attack-resilience
for free. Moreover, in our setting, for both the attacker the and controller the
state of the plant is completely observable.
We are unaware of any work that uses statistical model checking to evaluate
the resilience of adaptive controllers against (certain classes of) attacks.
8 Conclusions
We have introduced AMPC, a new model-predictive controller that unlike MPC,
comes with provable convergence guarantees. The key innovation of AMPC is
that it dynamically adapts its receding horizon (RH) to get out of local minima.
In each prediction step, AMPC calls PSO with an optimal RH and corresponding
number of particles. We used AMPC as a bird-flocking controller whose goal is
to achieve V-formation despite various forms of attacks, including bird-removal,
bird-position-perturbation, and advanced AMPC-based attacks. We quantified
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the resiliency of AMPC to such attacks using statistical model checking. Our
results show that AMPC is able to adapt to the severity of an attack by dy-
namically changing its horizon size and the number of particles used by PSO to
completely recover from the attack, given a sufficiently long horizon and execu-
tion time (ET). The intelligence of an attacker, however, makes a difference in
the outcome of a game if RH and ET are bounded before the game begins.
Future work includes the consideration of additional forms of attacks, includ-
ing: Energy attack, when the flock is not traveling in a V-formation for a certain
amount of time; Collisions, when two birds are dangerously close to each other
due to sensor spoofing or adversarial birds; and Heading change, when the flock
is diverted from its original destination (mission target) by a certain degree.
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